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Determinationand Composition
of Merchandise Imports
and Their Link to Capital Formation
Inthis chapter and the three that follow, the focus will be on merchandise
imports, with some attention given to service imports. The first steps will be to
explore the possibility of measuring an "import function" for the postwar
Colombian economy, to examine how imports have been allocated into
different categories, and to analyze the crucial link between imports and
capital formation. Finally, an over-all look will be taken at the different policy
instruments used to repress and manipulate the demand for imports, and at the
arguments given for relying on several of these instruments.
In chapters 4, 5,and6 these instruments will be examined in detail,
including tariffs, prior import deposits, the exchange rate, and administrative
import controls, emphasizing actual practice during 1970 and 1971, with
retrospective looks at the postwar evolution of the different mechanisms for
containing imports.
AN AGGREGATE IMPORT FUNCTION
The import function to be estimated is somewhat unusual. Time series for
merchandise imports entering Colombia legally cannot be assumed to result
solely from the interplay of the ex ante domestic demand for imports, itself the
difference between the domestic supply of and demand for importables, and a
perfectly price-elastic foreign supply of imports. During most of the period
under study, the institutional mechanism of import control explicitly aimed at
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regulating import permits so that actual imports would be in line with foreign-
exchange availability. Such actual and expected availability influenced the
amount of import permits granted and, as was seen in Chapter 1, payment
crises were blamed on departures from "prudence."
It would seem better, therefore, to seek the implicit average rules of pru-
dence econometrically rather than follow the usual path of making observed
imports a function of income and relative prices. Indeed, that usual path is
open to serious conceptual criticisms where imports are regulated, as in
Colombia. It can be argued that imports in such a case should be considered
the independent variable, with income and relative prices both becoming
dependent variables.
In what follows, an attempt is made to explain observed annual and
quarterly imports as a function of variables which Colombian policymakers
• typically regarded as proxies for actual and expected foreign-exchange availa-
bility, i.e., the level of reserves, expected merchandise exports, and aid.
Why reserves? If the authorities had in mind a desired level of reserves,
and always forecasted foreign-exchange earnings exactly, imports would
fluctuate with the latter, but would show no correlation with the former. It
• may be supposed, however, that forecasting is far from perfect, and that
unexpected increases or decreases in reserves will be followed by relaxation
or tightening of controls, which will be reflected in the level of imports with
some lag. The hypothesis is that imports in a given year or quarter will be
influenced by the difference between actual and desired central-bank reserves
d during previousyearsor quarters.
In the regressions that follow, gross central-bank reserves will be used.
e Earlier experiments showed that gross, rather than net, reserves gave the best
fits. This may be due to data problems involved in accurately defining net
reserves, but it could reflect a certain type of liquidity preference of central
bankers. Desired (gross) reserves were defined in a straightforward and
unsophisticated way. Using either occasional public declarations of the gov-
r ernment or the actual average ratio of gross reserves to imports for the whole
period under study, one obtains an estimate for the desired level of gross
reserves amounting to about one-fourth of annual imports, or three months'
worth of imports. This relationship has been applied below to actual annual or
quarterly imports to calculate desired reserves for each time period. In the
• annual regressions, only the imports of the previous year were used to
•r calculate desired reserves. If, for example, the average of imports during the
t previous two years had been used for the calculation a less variable series
would have been obtained for desired reserves. No extensive experimentation
• was carried out on this point either for annual or quarterly regressions, but the
•I assumption of a relatively short memory for exchange-control authorities,
going back only about a year, appears to work as well as longer alternatives.
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Note that from the time an import license is granted for a commodity to
the time the commodity enters Colombia—at which point it is included in our V.
timeseries—an average of four or five months is said to elapse. Imports of a
given time period can then be made to depend on lagged (actual and desired)
reserves, avoiding most problems of interdependence, particularly in quar-
terly regressions.1
There are several possible ways of handling expected (nonaid) foreign-
exchange earnings, the bulk of which, and probably its most volatile major
part, comes from merchandise exports. One way is to use lagged changes in
reserves as a proxy for these expectations. That approach was tried, yielding
on the whole poor results. Another (not tried) would be to rely on lagged
changes in coffee prices. In what follows, it was simply assumed that for a
given time period, the ex ante guesses of the authorities on average came close
to actual, realized merchandise exports. Since there is a lag between the
granting and using of import licenses, it should be clear that a given quarter's
actual exports can have little direct (Keynesian or monetary) effect on realized
imports of that quarter. Therefore, the simultaneous use of imports and
exports of the same quarter in a regression need not give rise to identification
problems. For the annual observations itis not so easy to dismiss the
possibility that exports will influence imports via income or money multi-
pliers; for that case it is necessary to rely primarily on a priori knowledge of
how import controls operate and of the chronic (but variable) presence of
excess demand for imports.
The inclusion of aid as an independent variable explaining imports in a
foreign-exchange—constrained economy seems natural. As the aid variable is
based on disbursements, which are in fact typically measured by documenta-
tion regarding import flows, the regressions can be viewed as measuring the
impact of the other two independent variables on the level of non-aid-financed
imports. It was, however, difficult accurately to measure quarterly, as con-
trasted with annual, aid flows. Repayments of principal were subtracted from
gross disbursements to yield net aid used in the regressions. Other capital
inflows were excluded from the explanation of imports because it was difficult
to separate them for the whole period into those which, like aid, could be
considered autonomous and those induced by changes in the import level, and
which may be regarded as accommodating, rather than explaining, import
fluctuations.
As in the case of minor exports, the over-all conceptual scheme used for
measuring aggregate functions has some weaknesses when applied to parts of
the import bill. During the period under study there have been, after all, some
imports placed under free lists, requiring no prior licenses from control
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SOURCE: For 1957—69, DANE-ADCE, various issues; for 1970—72, EMF-DOT, various
issues.
from quantitative controls. Presumably, these imports are influenced by tradi-
tional independent variables, such as relative prices and real incomes. Never-
theless, it remains true that the total import bill was under the control of
import authorities who in fact regulated the flow of licenses partly in response
to the behavior of unregulated imports. Indeed, the existence and size of a free
list was one of the instruments used to control the total import flow.
It is likely that the geographical sources of Colombian imports have been
influenced from time to time by the policy instruments used to repress import
demand and by the inflow of tied aid, but it is doubtful that such influences
have been particularly strong or lasting. More to the point of this chapter,
changes in the geographical pattern of imports suggest little about either the
past or the future levels of the import bill. Variations in such patterns, shown
in Table 3-1, reflect primarily trends regarding the relative competitiveness of
industrialized nations, as well as Colombian preferential trade arrangements
with other Latin American countries, all of which had led to a fairly diversi-
fied import bill in the early 1970s.
:0 TABLE 3-1
Recorded Merchandise Imports by Geographical Source, 1957—58 to 1970—72 9.
(per centof total)
1957—581959—621963—661967—69 1970—72
United States 59.6 55.2 49.0 47.2 42.3
Canada 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.4 3.0
United Kingdom 4.4 5.6 5.4 5.2 4.6
Japan 1.0 2.8 3.4 4.1 7.2
European Common Market 18.8 18.8 18.1 15.1 18.1
Other industrial Western
European 5.8 5.7 5.0 4.7 5.2
Other rionsocialist European 0.7 1.8 4.3 7.3 5.9
Andean Common Market 1.8 1.2 2.3 2.8 4.8
Other LAFTA 0.8 1.0 4.7 6.0 5.3
Central American Common
Market 0.3 0.3 0.1 — 0.1
Other Western Hemisphere 2.6 3.2 2.8 1.9 0.9
Socialist 0.5 0.8 1.7 2.6 1.8
Other 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
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Notes to Table 3-2
SOURCE:Dataon imports, exports, and reserves from IMF-IFS. Average gross reserves in
current year is the mean of reserves in March, June, September, and December of the current
year plus December of the previous year. Actual minus desired reserves are described in the
text. Net aid refers to disbursements, as registered in LMF-BOPY, covering long-term loans
received by central and local governments as well as those received by the private nonmonetary
sector from the IADB, IBRD, IFC, and U.S. government minus amortizations of those loans.
Data on loans for 1950—55 involved rough estimates of some components.
Regression Results.
Table 3-2 contains data used in the annual regressions and additional data
on how the independent variables for reserves and aid were constructed.
Using those data, the following result is obtained, where the figures in
— parenthesesare t statistics.
00
— M1=17.11+ 0.89X, + 0.65GR,_, +l.06A, (3-i)
(0.19)(4.88) (1.81) (3.05)
R2 =0.80;F statistic =25.82;DW =1.93;observations =23
where
T = merchandiseimports in year t
=merchandiseexports in year t
GR1_1 =actualminus desired reserves in previous year
A1 =netaid in year t
DW =Durban-Watsonstatistic. 4
Thefit of equation 3-1 is good; from the last column of Table 3-2 it may be
seen that it is particularly good for the years since 1966 taken as a whole,
during which actual imports averaged 99.7 per cent of predicted imports. and
absolute deviations around that mean were relatively small. Nevertheless,
adding 1971 and 1972 to the regression lowers the t statistics for the
coefficient; a regression covering just 1950—70 yields a t statistic of 2.20 for
that coefficient. If equation 3-1 is taken as embodying the average rule of
thumb followed by prudent import control authorities, its residuals should be
of interest and would be subject to runs reflecting persistent departures from
-— prudence.For example, the 1955—56 excesses stand out clearly, and are
followed by the 1958 austerity. Similarly, the swing from extreme tightness to
liberalization during 1965—66 is also reflected in the residuals. A more percep-
tive look at these subphases, however, will be obtained from quarterly data.
The coefficients for exports and net aid are not significantly different from
1.0 while the constant term is insignificant, all of which one would expect a86 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
priori, given the relative unimportance of service imports. The coefficient for
the difference between actual and desired reserves has the expected sign and
is significant at the 5 per cent level; it implies that 65 per cent of the excess (or
shortfall) in gross reserves during the preceding year is spent on (or withheld
from) imports during the current year. Experiments introducing further lags in
the GR variable were unsuccessful.2
Reliable quarterly data start in 1957; Table 3-3 contains the series used in
the following regression:
=62.72+ + 0.I9GR,_1 + I.87A, (3-2)
(4.48)(2.71)(2.93) (6.42)
R2 =0.65;F statistic =37.$7;DW =0.67;observations =64
The subscript t now refers to a given quarter; refers to actual
minus desired reserves throughout the previous four quarters. The regression
fit is again good; the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates, not surprisingly, the
presence of runs above and below the prudent norm.
Regression 3-2, taken literally, suggests that a given quarter's imports are
made up of some minimum amount, given by the constant term of about $63
million (contrasted with average quarterly imports of $147 million), plus one-
third of that quarter's current exports, plus a multiple of the aid inflow, all
adjusted by previous deviations between actual and desired reserves. As the
GR1_1 variables in equations 3-1 and 3-2 cover a similar time span, while the
dependent variable does not, the coefficient for in equation 3-2 should
be multiplied by four, yielding 0.76, before comparing it to the 0.65 coefficient
obtained in 3-1.
The coefficient for net aid in equation 3-2 is higher than the expected 1.0;
similar results were also obtained using gross aid. It should be noted that the
quarterly aid figures are rough estimates. Nevertheless, an aid coefficient
significantly higher than 1.0 may be picking up the effect of aid "leverage" on
import liberalization, an avowed policy goal of aid-providers during the period
under study. It could also reflect a perverse de facto positive correlation of aid
disbursements with good times (compare the figures for 1965 and 1967 with
those for earlier and later years).
Experiments introducing seasonal dummy variables, as well as actual
minus desired reserves further lagged, yielded insignificant results, but no
systematic effort was made to calculate the best reserve lag structure.
The last column of Table 3-3 presents actual imports as percentages of
those predicted by equation 3-2. Quarterly import series naturally reflect brief
unusual events more clearly than do annual data. Some are interesting for our
study, e.g., a temporary closing of the office issuing import permits, as during









Basic Data Used in Quarterly Import Regressions, 1957—72
(millions of current U.S.dollars)
Average Actual
Minus Desired Actual Imports
Year Gross Reserves as Per Cent of
and Merchandise in Previous Net MerchandiseImports Estimated
QuarterImports, c.i.f.Four Quarters Aid Exports by Eq. 3-2
19571 91.5 —38.9 2.3 140.0 86.1
II 98.2 1.8 2.3 117.4 92.3
111 138.9 41.3 2.3 138.2 114.9





















IC IV 90.4 12.4 1.5 119.7 83.9
1959I 86.3 30.5 —0.8 99.9 86.1
re II 107.3 55.4 —0.8 116.0 97.2
53 III 116.9 74.4 —0.8 139.9 95.9
e- IV 104.9 78.5 —0.8 117.2 91.1





























































III 147.3 —7.3 20.0 146.8 99.8
IV 105.5 — 13.9 20.0 107.8 79.1






















































Ig III 111.0 —48.9 19.8 141.6 80.8




Minus Desired Actual Imports
Year Gross Reserves as Per Cent of
and Merchandise in Previous Net MerchandiseImports Estimated
QuarterImports, c.i.f.Four Quarters Aid Exports by Eq. 3-2
1966 1 140.4 —36.6 24.5 123.8 98.3
II 168.0 —55.4 24.5 140.7 116.0
III 193.4 —67.9 24.5 131.6 138.7
IV 172.4 —91.0 24.5 110.3 134.7
1967 I 149.3 —112.6 23.3 114.1 121.5
II 111.1 —105.8 23.3 129.0 86.0
III 118.1 —85.3 23.3 129.9 88.6
IV 118.5 —61.5 23.3 136.8 84.5
1968 I 157.4 —46.5 32.8 128.4 99.7
II 167.0 —52.0 32.8 140.1 103.9
III 162.7 —55.0 32.8 144.0 100.8
IV 156.2 —50.7 32.8 145.7 96.0
1969 I 133.8 —37.6 38.8 '131.5 77.8
II 168.5 —6.7 38.8 168.2 88.7
III 203.1 5.0 38.8 150.6 108.9
IV 180.6 8.4 38.8 157.1 95.4
1970 I 161.8 14.3 40.0 210.4 76.9
II 176.9 34.3 40.0 202.2 83.7
III 209.7 60,9 40.0 175.1 101.1
IV 206.3 75.0 40.0 139.0 104.1
1971I 228.3 64.8 28.5 161.6 125.3
11 232.2 22.0 28.5 186.0 127.5
III 216.8 —20.6 28.5 166.8 129.3
IV 205.2 —43.9 28.5 171.6 124.5
1972 1 220.0 —44.4 45.2 156.5 115.2
II 190.0 —36.6 45.2 122.0 105.0
III 207.4 — 13.8 45.2 225.5 94.4
IV 219.1 10.6. 45.2 238.9 95.7
SouRce: Same as for Table 3-2. Figures in second column computed using end-of-quarter data for four
quarters preceding current quarter. Yearly net aid figures were allocated to quarters in four equal parts.
and shipping strikes. Noteworthy runs in actual imports are those of 1958111—
19591 (austerity), and the remarkable swings from austerity (19651— 19651 V) to
excess (196611—19671) and back to austerity (19671!— 19671V).3 Throughout
1971 and 1972, regression 3-2 underestimates actual imports;it may be
conjectured that easier access to world private capital markets, buttressed by
a favorable exchange earnings outlook, is changing the Colombian import
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UNREGISTERED MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
Given the long Colombian coasts on both the Pacific and Atlantic and its
frontiers with Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama, which add up
to more than nine thousand kilometers (more than fifty-six hundred miles) of
sea and land borders, coupled with a rigorous import control system, one
may wonder whether some merchandise imports escape official registration,
control, and taxes.4
It is obvious that some smuggling does take place. During August 1971
smuggled foreign cigarettes were openly sold in Bogota's main avenues, and I
was pleasantly startled to find Cuban cigars available in a Cartagena restau-
rant. Businessmen often tell of sending an employee to Miami to bring back,
well hidden in his suitcase, small but critical parts and pieces, which they feel
TABLE 3-4




United Kingdom, Common Other
World and Canada Market Countries
1958 1.07 1.24 1.09 0.63
1959 1.13 1.16 1.03 1.12
1960 1.13 1.17 1.08 1.02
1961 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.18
1962 1.18 1.20 1.18 1.09
1963 1.03 1.00 1.06 1.08
1964 1.11 1.09 1.11 1.14
1965 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.11
1966 1.07 1.06 1.11 1.05
1967 1.12 1.06 1.18 1.23
1968 1.02 1.01 1.06 1.00
1969 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.04
Averages 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.06
I.
t
SOURCE: Basic data from IMF-DOT, various issues. The corresponding ratios for the











1951 1.17 1955 1.23
1952 1.16 1956 1.25
1953 1.13 1957 1.16
1954 1.16
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would be unduly delayed or excessively taxed under the import control
mechanism. Some cities on the Venezuelan and Ecuadoran borders are well-
known centers of two-way unregistered trade. But the extent of such com-
merce is, of course, difficult to ascertain. Yet for the purpose of this chapter, it
is necessary to try to establish at least whether or not unregistered imports
invalidate the results obtained by manipulating registered import data.
A first approach will be to compare Colombian official import data with
what trade partners claim they have exported to Colombia. This is done, for
three broad geographical categories, in Table 3-4. As Colombia reports
imports c.i.f., and most countries register their exports f.o.b., a gap of roughly
10 per cent is to be expected between the two sets of figures; and, on average,
the gap between the figures for 1958 through 1969 are close to that. There are,
however, considerable year-to-year fluctuations and a downward trend if
U.S., U.K., and Canadian figures for 1948—57 are compared to those for 1958—
Unregistered Merchandise Imports, c.i.f., 1957—72












































































































SOURCE: IMF-BOPY, various issues.
a. Refers to military grants, which byinternationalconvention are omitted from the balance
of payments.ALLOCATION OF OBSERVED MERCHANDISE IMPORTS 91
roi 69. A good deal of the year-to-year variation appears to simply reflect statisti-
cal difficulties, but some of it can be linked to events in the Colombian
payments system. For example, unusual gaps between Colombian and U.S.-
it
I U.K.-Canadiandata in 1955—56 and 1962 suggest that overmvoicing was used
as a means of speculating against an overvalued peso.5
Most smuggled merchandise will appear in the official trade figures of
ith neither the importing nor the exporting country, or if they appear in the latter
for data they will not be allocated correctly among importing countries (i.e., much
rts merchandise apparently sent to Panama and Venezuela may end up in Colom-
bia; note that both Panama and Venezuela have followed relatively liberal
import policies). The importance of this trade has prompted "guesstimates"
re' of its value, one of which is presented in Table 3-5. The figures in the second
and third columns reflect minor statistical adjustments to import data as
8— reported to the IMF by Colombia; the first column represents an attempt to
estimate import smuggling. The "border trade" is estimated to have fluctuated
between 4 and 10 per cent of registered imports. Not surprisingly, the high
point was reached during troubled 1962, while the estimates for liberal 1966
are much lower. One may speculate that most, but not all, border trade
imports involve consumer goods (liquor, cigarettes, radios, watches, and even
pornographic materials). But given the orders of magnitude involvedit
appears that neither the results to be shown in Table 3-7 nor those of earlier
regressions would be much changed by inclusion of border trade.
ts
THE ALLOCATION OF OBSERVED
MERCHANDISE IMPORTS INTO DIFFERENT
CATEGORIES
Since we have derived an over-all import function, it is natural to analyze how
that import capacity was distributed among commodity types. Several ways of
classifying imports are possible. In this section three subdivisions are used,
based on annual data: consumer goods, raw materials and intermediate goods,
and capital goods. These data are shown in Table 3-6.
The allocation of imports among these categories will, of course, be
influenced by long- and short-term forces. Among the former, import-substi-
tuting industrialization looms large, but from the viewpoint of this study, it will
• be of greater interest to explore hypotheses regarding whether (and how)
import control authorities modify import structure on the basis of import
capacity.
It is part of the conventional wisdom that during difficult times import
•ce controlauthorities squeeze capital goods first, while trying to maintain the
flow of raw materials and intermediate goods. If so, the share of capital goods92 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
TABLE 3-6
































































































SOURCE: BdIR-IAGJD, various issues. Data for 1971 and 1972 refer to import registrations
with INCOMEX. Because of the delay in processing customs data, even the BdlR used those
ENCOMEX data in its annual report for 1972.
in the import bill should be positively related to the level of imports, while that
for raw materials and intermediate goods should show an inverse relationship.
The latter expectation is confirmed by the results given in Table 3-7, but the
former does not emerge as statistically significant, although the sign is the
expected one. There is little doubt that the severe import restrictions of 1957—
58 were particularly harsh on machinery and equipment imports. However,
the regressions for the whole period warn us against generalizing from that
experience and from assuming that more liberal import policies will necessar-
Allocation of Registered Merchandise Imports Among Major Use Categories,
1951—72
underlying data in U.S.
f.
IALLOCATION OF OBSERVED MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
TABLE 3-7
93
ily lead to a bigger share for capital goods imports. Observe how in 1966 that
share fell as imports rose dramatically. A positive link between the share of
consumer goods and import levels, however, can be established with confi-
dence for the whole period.
In countries with weak machinery and equipment industries, aid flows,
designed partly to promote investment, can be expected to influence the share
of capital goods in total imports. Such influence need not be dollar for dollar;
for example, food aid that supports a shift of agricultural workers to con struc-
Regressions for Shares in the Import Bill of Major Use Categories, 1951—72




























































R2 =coefficientof multiple determination.
DW =Durbin-Watsonstatistic.
SOURCE:Seetext. Basic data obtained as in earlier tables of this chapter. The
following simple correlation coefficients are of interest:
Share of consumer goods
Share of raw materials and
intermediate goods
Share of capital goods
















tion projects can contribute to capital formation even though it has no direct
impact on imports of capital goods. But typically, a link can be expected;
this is indeed the case for Colombia, as shown in Table 3-7. Indeed, the most
significant coefficient in the regression explaining the share of capital goods in
the import bill is that for net aid.
The trend for the share of consumer goods in all imports is clearly
downward, matched by a rising trend for raw materials and intermediate
goods.
IMPORTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION
C,
In Chapter 1, I noted the clear and strong link that has existed in Colombia
between foreign trade and capital formation, contrasting it with the weaker
(short-term) correlation between changes in GDP or manufacturing output and
trade conditions.6 The link between foreign trade and capital formation does
not involve subtle and mysterious relationships between exports (or terms of T
trade) and propensities to save. The matter is much simpler. During 1950—54
imported commodities accounted for 94 per cent of Colombian gross invest-
ment in machinery and equipment; by 1971—72 that share was still a remark-
able 68 per cent in spite of rapid growth in the local output of machinery and
equipment. During the period under study Colombian investment other than
construction could hardly be realized, at least during a longish medium term,
without a matching capacity to import. Coffee and, later, aid and minor
exports were the basis of nonconstruction capital formation. Note that nothing
in the argument assures us that the flow of imported capital goods will be
assigned wisely or used fully; therefore, even in the long run no rigid link need
exist between growth and the capacity to import. Indeed, it can be argued that
periods of import bonanza may lead to a careless allocation of investment,
while austerity strengthens the hand of cost-benefit analysts. But without
V
substantialimport capacity, even heroic ex ante savings decisions are likely to e
be frustrated before ever becoming tangible in ex post nonconstruction invest- s9
ments.
The capital formation—import link is documented in Table 3-8, where
imports and a time trend appear as the independent variables. The link
emerges quite clearly from these regressions; one can discount part of the
excellence of the fit on grounds of national accounting methodology without
losing the main conclusion.
The elasticity of real gross investment in machinery and equipment with ne
respect to merchandise imports is not significantly different from 1.0; that for fo
all investment emerges as slightly below 1.0. Even investment in construction
shows some significant elasticity with respect to imports, although its trendIMPORTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION 95
TABLE 3-8
LinksBetween Capital Formation and Imports:
)st Regression Results, 1950—72

















































R2 0.95 0.87 0.96 0.82











R2 =coefficientof multiple determination.
DW =Durbin-Watsonstatistic.
SOURCE: Time series on gross investment and imports of capital goods in constant 1958
Colombian pesos from BdlR-CN, including unpublished estimates. Current-dollar value of
merchandise imports from IMF-IFS. All gross fixed domestic capital formation is the sum of
building and construction plus machinery and equipment.
variable, as expected, shows a heftier t statistic than that for machinery and
to equipment. The Durbin-Watson statistics for the construction regressions also
suggest that important independent variables have been left out in the explana-
tion of that type of investment, a fact we know from Chapter 1.
As import quantity indices are available only with a long lag, the regres-
nk sions shown in Table 3-8 were estimated using current-dollar values for
he recorded imports. The trend coefficients, therefore, particularly the coefficient
)ut for machinery and equipment, reflect two offsetting forces: a positive one
arising from the fast growth in local production of capital goods, and a
ith negative one arising from the upward creep in dollar prices paid by Colombia
for for imports, which may be estimated at about 2 per cent per year during the
period under study.
nd In the last column of Table 3-8, the time series for imports of capital96 MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
goods used in the Bd1R national accounts is compared with total imports.
Here, in apparent contrast to the results presented earlier (Table 3-7), the
elasticity of capital goods imports with respect to import levels is greater than
1.0, but the level of significance of this result is not sufficiently high to change
my earlier conclusion of proportionality, excluding trend and aid flows.
d The fits obtained in Table 3-8 could be further improved by making
investment depend not on total imports, but only on imports of capital goods.
Such refinement, however, seems unnecessary and even inelegant given the
proportionality conclusion and the national accounts methodology. Finally, it
may be noted that the rapid growth observed for the whole period in the
domestic production of machinery and equipment suggests that in the future
the link between imports and capital formation will be less tight than in the
past.
POLICY INSTRUMENTS USED TO REPRESS
IMPORTS t
The import function estimated earlier in this chapter emphasized the power of
authorities to limit imports according to foreign-exchange availabilities. The e
mechanisms used specifically to contain imports have been mainly four: the e
tariff, prior import deposits, the exchange rate applicable to imports, and
import licensing. Other more general policy variables, such as credit, have
also been manipulated for the purpose of containing imports, often at the
expense of growth. The focus of the next three chapters will be on just the four
specific mechanisms listed, leaving the discussion of interactions between
trade and macroeconomic policies for chapters 7 and 8.
Since the Great Depression, the typical assumption of Colombian policy-
makers has been that the imports demanded by the public would exceed the
foreign exchange available to finance them. At the exchange rates, tariffs, and
other import charges which prevailed during most of the period, this was
indeed the case; so available foreign exchange ended up being rationed also by
the system of exchange and import licensing. The burden carried by each of
the rationing mechanisms, as the authorities struggled to bring the demand for
imports into line with exchange availabilities, changed from year to year, and
there has been a constantly fluctuating mix of those four instruments since
World War II. In retrospect, the authorities appear to have had a vague desire
to avoid having any single instrument bear an excessive burden in the task of
repressing imports. In other words, when pressures on the licensing authori-
ties became great, i.e., when delays and rejections of import and exchange
license requests rose above some tolerable level, there was a tendency to
devalue the import exchange rate, or to raise tariffs and surcharges, or toPOLICY INSTRUMENTS USED TO REPRESS IMPORTS 97
ts. increase prior import deposits. On the other hand, if the exchange rate was
he considered adequate, surges in import demand tended to be met by tighter
licensing procedures, higher duties, or higher prior import deposits.
ge Much of this balancing among instruments was done "by ear," and in
different ways according to the types of imports. As a result, it is difficult to
ng trace historically the import-repressing weight carried by each policy in a
Is. -givenyear. It is clear, however, that the ultimate weapon, not always brought
he into play at the opportune time, was import and exchange licensing, based, in
it turn, on actual and expected exchange availability. It is also clear that in
he practically all years under study (1950—72), the import and exchange controls
ire had a certain bite, in the sense that the exchange rate, tariffs, and import
he deposits left an ex ante demand for imports higher than what the authorities
thought could be financed.
• : Thereasons given in Colombia for relying on a variety of import-repress-
ing mechanisms rather than just one (e.g., the exchange rate, perhaps coupled
• with a uniform across-the-board tariff) are several. The most interesting relate
to the instability of the world coffee market and to the consequent burden of
adjustment expected to fall on Colombia. Assume that Colombia is a price
of taker in the international coffee market and that there is just one flexible
he exchange rate. Without a licensing mechanism, and with domestic full
he employment policies, a sudden and unexpected drop in world coffee prices
-rid will lead to a devaluation, while an increase will lead to an appreciation of the
ye exchange rate. It has been argued by many influential Colombians that even in
he the medium run, price elasticities are such that without the licensing mecha-
iir nism, the exchange rate must fluctuate as much as world coffee prices.7 The
en shifting of resources in and out of the import-competing and export sectors
would have unfavorable effects on welfare, while asymmetrical reactions to
devaluation and appreciation,itis further argued, would also impart an
he inflationary bias to the economy. Exchange-rate instability reflecting the
id I instabilityin world coffee prices would tend to destroy the "moneyness" of
as the Colombian peso.
DY The holding of much larger Colombian foreign-exchange reserves would
be an alternative to a totally flexible exchange rate, but it has been argued that
or import and exchange licensing coupled with a moderate reserve level is a
cheaper and safer way of tackling the instability problem. The possibility that
Ce either domestic or foreign speculators would take up the whole burden of
- offsetting gyrations in coffee prices or exchange rates is not taken very
Of seriously (with good reason).
ri- Note that in this argument import and exchange licensing are closely
ge interlinked, a lesson painfully learned during 1956—58. Granting import li-
to censes freely and holding back later on permits to buy foreign exchange ob-
to viously lead to a piling up of commercial arrears and to the transformation of
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private debts to suppliers into national foreign debt as the external credit of the
country is damaged by payment delays and pressure is exerted by foreign
creditors on Colombian authorities. There are, of course, other reasons for
maintaining exchange controls, particularly regulating the capital account of
the balance of payments and, also, some service items in the current account,
particularly profit and royalty remittances. Furthermore, there is in Colombia,
as elsewhere, skepticism regarding the effectiveness of prices in regulating
quantities demanded; in particular, the long duration of import controls and ill-
fated brief liberalization attempts have generated the myth of an irrepressible




I. The definition of desired reserves makes one of the independent variables, actual minus
desired reserves, partlyafunction of the lagged dependent variable. In the determination of
desired reserves the import level is best viewed as a proxy for the expected level of payments
imbalances.
2. The (economic) expectation was that proper specification of the lags would yield coeffi-
cients for the GR variables adding up closer to 1.0, but that expectation could not be realized
econometrically.
3. Given a priori knowledge regarding import licensing during these runs, a case could be
made for introducing different dummy variables for these periods, thereby improving the regres-
sion results. But little of substance would be gained by such a procedure.
4. The Colombian islands of San Andrés, off the coast of Nicaragua in the Caribbean, have
free-port privileges. Heavy tourist traffic between these islands and the Colombian mainland adds
to the smuggling possibilities. The existence of the free port of Leticia plus the export zones
mentioned in Chapter 2 adds to the worries of those charged with controlling inward smuggling.
5. Thus, some of the departures from prudence detected in the first part of this chapter should
be interpreted broadly, to include excesses in the licensing of imports, capital exports, or both.
6. ma correlation of year-to-year percentage changes in real GDP (GDP) and manufacturing
output (MA) with those for the dollar value of merchandise imports (M), during the same year (:),
and the year before (t —I),the following results were obtained for the period from 1951 through
1972:
A A




=6.30+ 0.04Mg ÷ O.OOIM_1
(15.22)(2.13) (0.06)
R2 =0.20
If the value of imports in year t relative to import levels during I— I,I— 2,and t— 3is used
as the independent variable, similarly weak results are obtained. Both types of regression showNOTES 99
that while there is a significant link betweenimportand output growth, the constant terms account
for most of the GDP and manufacturing year-to-year growth. See also the interesting article by
Alberto Corchuelo R. and Luis Bernardo Florez E., "El Sector Externo y las Fluctuaciones de
Corto Plazo de IaEconomia,"in DANE-BME, November 1971, pp. 9—2 1.
7. Consider the following Colombian-like situation before and after a 20 per cent drop in
world coffee prices, assuming no change in the quantity of coffee exports:
Before After
Coffeeexports $400 $320
Other exports 150 180
Imports 550 500
le
)fl To bring about the increase in other exports and the contraction of imports, assuming a supply
price elasticity of 1.0 for other exports and ofabout —0.45 in the price elasticity of import demand,
a 20 per cent devaluation in the noncoffee exchange rate would be required, assuming no increase
in the prices of home goods. These arguments assume that stabilizing speculation is limited in both
the coffee and the foreign-exchange markets.
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